Tactics of Moral DisengagementSam MartinJanuary 13, 2010Cognitive misconstrual of reprehensible behavior in a way that increases its moral acceptability (Bandura, 1986).moral justificationOne set of disengagement practices operates on the cognitive reconstruction of the behavioritself. People do not ordinarily engage in harmful conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. In this process of moral justification, detrimental conduct is madepersonally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes.People then can act on a moral imperative and preserve their view of themselves as a moral agentwhile inflicting harm on others. Regional variations in the social sanctioning and use of violentmeans are predictable from moral justifications rooted in a subcultural code of honor (Cohen &Nisbett, 1994). (Bandura, 1999)euphemistic labelingLanguage shapes thought patterns on which actions are based. Activities can take on verydifferent appearances depending on what they are called. Not surprisingly, euphemistic language is widely used to make harmful conduct respectable and to reduce personal responsibility for it.Euphemizing is an injurious weapon. People behave much more cruelly when assaultive actions are verbally sanitized than when they are called aggression (Diener, Dineen, Endresen, Beaman, & Fraser, 1975). (Bandura, 1999)advantageous comparisonAdvantageous comparison is another way of making harmful conduct look good. Howbehavior is viewed is colored by what it is compared against. By exploiting the contrast principle, reprehensible acts can be made righteous. Terrorists see their behavior as acts of selfless martyrdom by comparing them with widespread cruelties inflicted on the people with whom they identify. The more flagrant the contrasting inhumanities, the more likely it is that one’s own destructive conduct will appear benevolent. For example, the massive destruction in Vietnam was minimized by portraying the American military intervention as saving the populous from Communist enslavement. (Bandura, 1999)Individual obscures or distorts the effects of harmful actions (Bandura, 1986).displacement of responsibilityMoral control operates most strongly when people acknowledge that they cause harm bytheir detrimental actions. The second set of disengagement practices operates by obscuring, orminimizing the agentive role in the harm one causes. People will behave in ways they normallyrepudiate if a legitimate authority accepts responsibility for the effects of their conduct (Diener,1977; Milgram, 1974). Under displaced responsibility, they view their actions as stemming from the dictates of authorities rather than being personally responsible for them. Because they are not the actual agent of their actions, they are spared self-condemning reactions. diffusion of responsibility disregarding or distorting the consequences. (Bandura, 1999)diffusion of responsibilityThe exercise of moral control is also weakened when personal agency is obscured bydiffusing responsibility for detrimental behavior. Kelman (1973) provides a discerning analysis of the different ways in which a sense of personal agency get obscured by diffusing personalaccountability. There are several ways of doing it. A sense of responsibility can be diffused, andthereby diminished, by division of labor. Most enterprises require the services of many people, each performing subdivided jobs that seem harmless in themselves. After activities become routinized into detached subfunctions, people shift their attention from the morality of what they are doing to the operational details and efficiency of their specific job. (Bandura, 1999)disregard or distortion of consequencesAdditional ways of weakening moral control operate by disregarding or distorting the effectsof one's actions. When people pursue activities that are harmful to others for reasons of personalgain or social pressure, they avoid facing the harm they cause or minimize it. If minimization does not work, the evidence of harm can be discredited. As long as the harmful results of one's conduct are ignored, minimized, distorted or disbelieved, there is little reason for self-censure to be activated. (Bandura, 1999)Reducing identification with the targets of harmful acts.dehumanizationThe final set of disengagement practices operates on the recipients of detrimental acts. Thestrength of moral self-censure depends partly on how the perpetrators view the people they mistreat. Correlative interpersonal experiences during formative years, in which people experience joys and suffer pain together, create the foundation for empathic responsiveness to the plight of others (Bandura, 1986). To perceive another in terms of common humanity activates empathetic emotional reactions through perceived similarity and a sense of social obligation (Bandura, 1992; McHugo, Smith, & Lanzetta, 1982). The joys and suffering of those with whom one identifies are more vicariously arousing than are those of strangers or of individuals who have been divested of human qualities. It is, therefore, difficult to mistreat humanized persons without suffering personal distress and self-condemnation. (Bandura, 1999)attribution of blame.Blaming one's adversaries or circumstances is still another expedient that can serve selfexonerative purposes. In this process, people view themselves as faultless victims driven to injurious conduct by forcible provocation. Punitive conduct is, thus, seen as a justifiable defensive reaction to belligerent provocations. Conflictful transactions typically involve reciprocally escalative acts. One can select from the chain of events a defensive act by the adversary and portray it as initiating provocation. Victims then get blamed for bringing suffering on themselves. Self-exoneration is also achievable by viewing one's harmful conduct as forced by compelling circumstances rather than as a personal decision. By fixing the blame on others or on circumstances, not only are one's own injurious actions excusable but one can even feel self-righteous in the process. (Bandura, 1999)References:Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A socialcognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the preparation of inhumanities.Personal and Social Psychology Review, 3, 193–209.Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. 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