Short analysis of par. 61
of the
Preface of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
2009 © Robbert Veen
61/1. What has been said can be expressed
formally in this way.
The word formally is essential here. This whole treatment of the nature of philosophical method by the use of general terms describing philosophical and non-philosophical propositions, remains external to the development of these notions in the science of logic.
61/2 The nature of judgment, that is, of the proposition per se which includes the distinction of subject and predicate within itself, is destroyed by the speculative judgment, and the identical proposition, which the former comes to be, contains the counter-stroke to those relations.
1. A proposition contains a distinction of subject and predicate. It is a special form of a sentence, which Hegel defines as predicating an event or an individual content of a subject, or as in universal sentences, (the predicate is an abstract universal) an external connection that derives its necessity from something other than itself.
2. The speculative proposition is an action taken against a normal proposition, destroying the distinction of the subject and predicate and emphasizing the identity of both, as expressed in the copula "is." So we go from the inherence of an universal contents in a posited subject, to an identification of two separate contents.
3. In a way we are left with two separate propositions: the one we started with that contains the difference of subject and predicate, and the one that expresses the result of the application of the speculative proposition, which is the same but now with the emphasis on the identity of subject and predicate. The result is that the difference of subject and predicate is now seen as a harmony of both their contents. That unity implies that the predicate expresses "substance" as well as the subject, and the subject expresses the universal content as well as the predicate, and that their difference is simply a difference of emphasis.
4. Going beyond that, we can say that both the logical unity and the logical difference are the necessary form of the judgment, that expresses the ontological nature of the reality in question.
61/4. This conflict between the form
of a proposition per se and the unity of the
concept which destroys that form is similar
to what occurs in the rhythm between
meter and accent. Rhythm results from the
oscillating mid-point and unification of
both.
iambic pentameter ,
Meter= (5x iambe)
So lóng as mén can bréathe and éyes can sée
da-Dum-da-Dum-da-Dum-da-Dum-da-Dum
Accent is: every second syllable has stress.
Rythm is the whole, the iambic pentameter.
61/5. In that way, in the philosophical
proposition, the identity of subject and
predicate does not abolish their distinction,
which is expressed in the form of the
proposition.
The identity of subject and predicate is like the unity of meter and accent in rhythm. It does not destroy the difference, but it keeps the different together. It allows for changes in form without changing the content. The form of the proposition emphasizes the difference but expresses identity as well.
S ->P ------------------------ God is Love
S(P) -> P(S) ---------------- Love is God (or: divine)
S=P -------------------------- God expresses Love
61/6. Instead, their unity emerges as
a harmony. The form of the proposition is
the appearance of the determinate sense,
that is, the accent that distinguishes its
fruition.
In the proposition one particular accent emerges: the predicate is universal content, and the logical subject refers to (a) substance. It stresses the predicate as the moment of determinacy. When the proposition is read with emphasis on identity, the two propositions appear as complementary.
61/7. However, when the predicate
expresses the substance and the subject
itself falls under the universal, there is the
unity in which that accent fades away.
The combination of these two propositions changes the accentuation of one to an equal distribution of emphasis, or rather the emphasis lies now in the middle, on the copula "is", that expresses both identity and difference: being as the logical unity of the different. The jambe (da-dum) becomes a trochee (dum-da) in the reversal, and then through their unification becomes a spondee (dum-dum).
61. Formell kann das Gesagte so
ausgedrückt werden, daß die Natur des
Urteils oder Satzes überhaupt, die den
Unterschied des Subjekts und Prädikats in
sich schließt, durch den spekulativen Satz
zerstört wird, und der identische Satz, zu
dem der erstere wird, den Gegenstoß zu
jenem Verhältnisse enthält. - Dieser
Konflikt der Form eines Satzes überhaupt
und der sie zerstörenden Einheit des
Begriffs ist dem ähnlich, der im Rhythmus
zwischen dem Metrum und dem Akzente
stattfindet. Der Rhythmus resultiert aus der
schwebenden Mitte und Vereinigung
beider. So soll auch im philosophischen
Satze die Identität des Subjekts und
Prädikats den Unterschied derselben, den
die Form des Satzes ausdrückt, nicht
vernichten, sondern ihre Einheit als eine
Harmonie hervorgehen. Die Form des
Satzes ist die Erscheinung des bestimmten
Sinnes oder der Akzent, der seine Erfüllung
unterscheidet; daß aber das Prädikat die
Substanz ausdrückt und das Subjekt selbst
ins Allgemeine fällt, ist die Einheit, worin
jener Akzent verklingt.