Summary of the preface; paragraph 1 to 5
The first section of the preface running from paragraph 1 up to and including paragraph 6 is essentially a brief statement on how to approach any work of philosophy.
1, 2. Hegel argues that the ordinary way in which a writer introduces his book - explaining the end, the circumstances, the relationship to other treatises, the general content and results - is contrary to the nature of philosophical truth.
Such a preface would contain nothing but assertions, either about the final result which seems to have absolutely expressed the complete content or about the particulars in a superficial and descriptive manner.
Comment.
It seems to me that in reading the preface from this moment onward, we need to become aware of the way we approach Hegel. If our own endeavor consists only in a description of the purpose or the circumstances of Hegel's philosophy, its relationship to other philosophers or the general content and results of his books, we fall ourselves under this judgment, that it has nothing to do with the proper way in which to expound philosophical truth. What we find however in the majority of cases, books on Hegel do not try to understand Hegel's thought from within, and speak about Hegel's development as an author, the historical circumstances of his writing and his relationship to his predecessors and pupils, especially Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx.
3. In speaking about the relationship to other treatises we not only introduce an extraneous interest, but we also presuppose that the variety in philosophical positions must imply a contradiction instead of a progressive evolution of truth. There is, as Hegel puts it, an "equal necessity of all moments (that) constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole." Refutation within philosophy resembles the relationship between the blossom and the bud. These are not contradictory, nor simply different, but both must be considered to be moments of an organic unity, being equally necessary to build up the whole.
Comment.
It is true that philosophers in all ages have expressed the meaning of their own work by showing the inadequacy of the work of others. That would include however both the external and literary relationships that Hegel rejects and the internal logical relationships that according to him would belong to a true history of philosophy
4. Yet people expect such assertions and explanations to be the core business of any philosophy. It is however just a way to avoid the issue while appearing to deal with it in earnest. One should understand that the real subject matter is not exhausted in its purpose, nor in the intention of the author, nor in the so-called results taken separately, but only in the complete development of the subject. The result as such is merely an assertion if it is presented without the process in which it was arrived at. Purposes, intentions etc. are opinions, lifeless universals without any concrete realization. It also assumes the shape of presenting distinctions, which remain merely abstract. Because any distinction that we make only points to the limit of the subject or in other words it merely says what the subject is not.
Comment.
Again we would be wise to consider Hegel's position in this. Is it not true that in most cases discussions about Hegel are about these purposes, intentions, the opinions that he holds and not about the propositions and concepts as such? Hegel would argue that only an understanding of the complete development of the subject would deal with the real subject matter. Debating principles where Hegel had none or positions, that Hegel was not interested in or to discuss opinions, that Hegel put no value to, seems an odd way to go about it.
What is needed in philosophy is a way of thinking that remains focused on the subject itself instead of moving away all too quickly to other things. What is needed is not only to pass judgment on any given content but also to grasp it. The combination of understanding and the ability to judge may lead to the systematic exposition of the subject.
5. The process of education begins by acquiring knowledge of universal principles and then to learn to give supporting arguments or refutations. To this will be added a living experience of the subject matter itself. And finally, conceptual thought will penetrate the meaning of these experiences.
Comment.
One might infer from these statements, that according to Hegel the process of education has three stages. Abstract principles constitute the first stage, living experience gives us deeper insight at the second stage, but ultimately both need to come together in real understanding, i.e. conceptual thought in the third stage. The attempt has been made by those who see the phenomenology as the educational introduction to system, to see in these three stages a schematic of the structure of Hegel's phenomenology. However, even though the phenomenology begins with a shape of immediate knowledge that employs the abstract concept of being, one cannot say that this is a stage in which all of reality is expressed as abstract principles - notice the plural here. A principle is a formal concept that expresses the determination of a category of beings as the formal cause of their determinacy. It is an abstract universal. A principle is never sublated, but only has instances.
Nor can one say that somewhere in the phenomenology the aspects of living experience is introduced. If it's in there at all, it's in there from the beginning. Nor can one say that conceptual thought is only the result of the phenomenology, even though the next step must be made by the science of logic. First, conceptual thought is the medium also of the phenomenology as a whole. In that respect there is no difference between the chapters on consciousness and the chapters on Spirit or religion. Second, if conceptual thought is identified with the logic, this would make the system i.e. the Encyclopedia to be the second part of Hegel's philosophy. That would mean that phenomenology, logic and system would make up the syllogism in which the logic i.e. the subjective idea is the middle term. If that were true, it would be fair to say that Hegel's philosophy is a subjective idealism. However, as I have made clear elsewhere with reference to the 1962 thesis by Jan Hollak, Hegel's philosophy unfolds itself in the syllogism of phenomenology, system of philosophy and philosophy of history. The middle term in the syllogism is in that case the pure concept or idea.
6. On this basis it is easy to see that the true shape in which truth exists can only be a systematic development of truth in scientific form. Philosophy should be science, i.e. actual knowledge and not simply love of knowledge. This project has both an inner and an external necessity. First of all it is the very nature of knowledge to become science, proof of which lies in the exposition of philosophy itself. That is the internal necessity.
The external necessity is also derived from the nature of knowledge, but is shown in the process of time in which its various moments have their existence. The history of philosophy proves this necessity equally well as the understanding of the nature of knowledge. In the same way that all knowledge strives to be complete and perfect, i.e. actual knowledge, so did philosophy in its history.
Comment.
According to Hegel the inner and external necessity of science are identical. The process in which knowledge develops into science, and the history of the dialog of philosophers are analogous or even identical. The idea on which this identity is based, can only be shown in the actual execution of the scientific program. It is here expressed as the opinion that the diversity of philosophical systems, like the diversity of intellectual concepts, should be understood as the dynamic development of truth and not merely as contradictory.