The theologian Karl Barth asked the question why the philosophy of Hegel never achieved the position in Protestant Christianity that the philosophy of Thomas achieved for Roman Catholicism.
For a long time it looked however as though he did. After all he claimed that the content of philosophy was the same as the content of religion. Both philosophy and theology therefore aimed at the exposition of the absolute truth. The science of logic was the demonstration of divine thought, and he even identified philosophy with religious piety. In a famous passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit he gave a philosophical analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity as expressive of Western culture as a whole and claimed in his philosophy of religion that the so-called revealed religion of Christianity was the ultimate form of religion as such and the condition of philosophical knowledge. In this manner Hegel try to resolve the long-standing conflict between reason and revelation.
The Dignity of Theology There are many principles in Hegel's philosophy of religion, that remind theology of its own task and dignity. For one thing, the principle that theology should be concerned with truth, instead of talking about faith as a psychological condition or referring to mystic experiences that go above and beyond all rationality. Theology cannot afford to be just a hermeneutic of history, or a form of applied psychotherapy, or a system of moral values or just a description of religious phenomena. The second thing is, that if theology is serious about truth, then its truth should be expressed as history, event, implying that what we call the Word of God is taken as the word of truth only if it's related to the Event of Truth. Theology should accept the burden of explaining the life, death and resurrection of Christ as the center of its claim to truth. 19th century theology in many ways destroyed religious truth by its reconstruction of religious history in a skeptical historicism, and by the attempts to reconstruct a separate truth as some eternal principle in the abstract act of religion - e.g. in the theology of Schleiermacher.
Panentheism The problem with Hegel's conception of God however, was what is commonly called Hegel's panentheism or his all-in-God-ism. According to Hegel God is not transcendent to his creation, but spirit and nature are equally the manifestation of the divine absolute. God can only be truly God within human self-consciousness because that is how the divine spirit manifests itself in history. The relationship between God and his creation is therefore one of necessity, and the act of creation is not free and sovereign, but more like an emanation. Creation flows forth from the divine nature as an event.
Even though Hegel admittedly stressed the importance of the so-called positive and historical form of religion, the events of the sacred history were seen as moments within the necessary unfolding of the divine nature. In general Hegel did not accept contingency, the element of the unexpected within history. History was seen with the paradigm of organic development. The theologian however, deriving his understanding of history from the sources of revelation, needed to be concerned with the vertical intrusion of a transcendent God within human history. The coming of Christ is not the outcome of any organic development within human culture, nor was the history of the Church simply the unfolding of the potential of that particular event. The theological concept of Providence was not identical to the idea of necessary development.
Why Theology and Philosophy Are Not Identical So what were the theological principles that could not be given up in order to accept the Hegelian synthesis of religion and philosophy?
Karl Barth listed a few of them in his book: The Protestant Theology in the 19th Century (1946).
the concept of sin
the concept of reconciliation
the transcendence of God
the identification of the event of revelation with being revealed or manifest
the inappropriate identification of humanity with Christ
the denial of the free sovereignty of God
According to Hegel sin and human finitude were identical. Human finitude was part of the movement of the divine spirit through its otherness to itself. The concept of reconciliation was robbed of its historical nature by being redefined in this manner:
The divine nature is just this, to be absolute Spirit, that is to say the unity of the divine and human nature.
Accordingly transcendence is no longer the formal expression of God as such. The movement within the divine nature, i.e. his distinguishing himself from himself, to become his own object, and yet in this distinction to be absolutely identical to itself, is identical to the principle of the movement of human thought. Precisely by overcoming the notion of transcendence as a part of an abstract understanding of the nature of the divine - as shown in the chapter on unhappy consciousness in the phenomenology, and as shown in the analysis of the Trinity in the chapter on religion - Hegel achieves the conceptual unity of God and humanity.
If that is the case, the divine revelation is not an intrusion within human history, but a necessary consequence of it. Or in other words, the history of European culture and the revelation of God are ultimately identical.
When talking about the events of revelation, Hegel stresses the community to which this revelation has meaning. God is identified with the Spirit for the congregation but the sense of this revelation is the fact that God is identical to the Spirit of the congregation. That works both ways. The congregation, as a community of the spirit, realizes the divine potential within history. That is of course a wonderful image of the ideal community. This God however can only be truly God, in so far as He is the true spirit of the congregation. That implies that humanity is as necessary for God, as God is necessary for humanity.
The Burden of Theology Theology cannot escape the burden that is placed upon it by history. It has to be the interpretation of the truth that is presented to it by the prophetic and apostolic witness of the Bible within the context of the ongoing dialogue which is called Church tradition and theology. From that source it has to accept the basic notion of the divine self revelation as the sovereign Lord that is transcendence to his creation as well as human history. It has to start with the facts of revelation in order to explore the possibility of revelation. But it cannot start by conceptual understanding of the possibility of revelation, without imposing a logical construct.
By rewriting the contents of theological dogmatics into the language of philosophical concepts, Hegel did express a specific stage in the development of European culture. The attempt to view that specific culture as the totality of all spiritual development, should however be seen in the light of the history after Hegel. What he saw as a necessary development dictates its by the nature of the absolute itself, turned out to be a finite chapter in an ongoing history in which the unexpected and even destructive forces of human liberty belie the idea that human history is simply the extension of the divine nature.
In order to safeguard the true nature of God as well as the true nature of humanity, it may be necessary to stress the transcendence of God or the so-called theological difference in theology. That means that philosophy should again identify the infinite as something that does not contain the finite, but allows the finite to be finite. History again should be understood in its contingency, as allowing for a sovereign freedom that is not the pre-determined outcome of its history. Revelation should again be understood as an intrusion in history and not as a moment of its development.
All of that would imply a fundamental deviation from Hegel's philosophy. In my view nonetheless a necessary one.
In my previous blog I mentioned in passing that a theologian can not accept the principle that the finite is contained within the infinite. I hinted at the possibility of understanding the relation between the finite and infinite in a different way by invoking the formula to allow the finite to be finite.
I am aware of the fact that such brief statements more often than not increase confusion and demand a full philosophical demonstration. Bob's question about my arguments for this statement however opens up a large warehouse full of worms.
But I accept the responsibility of the least elucidating why I said what I said, leaving the true exposition on the list of future assignments.
Let me identify the problem and explain the position that Hegel reaches first. In the next blog I will explain the other option.
If the finite is not contained within the infinite, the finite is external to the infinite and therefore the finite limits the infinite. If the infinite however is limited by the finite, it is finite by default.
The Abstract Infinite
Hegel discusses the nature of spurious or bad infinity in paragraph 94 of his Encyclopedia. There is such a thing as a negative infinity which is only the negation of the finite. When we conceive of reality as simply existing, as a simple something (Etwas), we use a category that implies both affirmation and negation or limitation. Something is always different from something else (Anderes). Something always becomes something else, which then in turn becomes something that becomes something else again and so forth. This movement that arises from the inner nature of the category of something, seems to go on ad infinitum. The world seems to present itself as the endless transition from something to another something.
Hegel argues that this endless transition is an abstract or negative infinity. It has no positive meaning but it simply expresses the necessity to move beyond anything finite. The transitoriness implies that something becomes an other, and the finitude implies that any something is different from something else. The abstract infinite appears as the unlimited transition between both these determinations. Now this is what we normally would think of as the infinite, as that which simply goes on and on. Our understanding can easily create such an infinity because it's the product of a simple negation. Infinity is then just the abstract negation of the finite, the unending.
The Abstract Infinite is Finite
If the infinite is just the opposite of the finite however, then this opposition implies a limitation of the infinite. If the finite is not the infinite, then the infinite is not the finite. It is limited by what it is not, i.e. by the finite. But that was the nature of the finite to begin with! If the infinite is limited by the finite, then it is finite itself. True infinity therefore cannot stand in opposition to the finite. The only way that is left for the infinite to be genuinely infinite will then be for it to contain the finite within itself. The opposition between the finite and the infinite would have to be removed. If the infinite absorbs the finite as its internal moment it can remain what it is. The infinite and the finite should not be seen as externally related, but as internally related. Only because the true i contains the finite with the itself is it not limited, or defined by anything other than itself.
True Infinity
In paragraph 95 of the encyclopedia Hegel explains the nature of true infinity. In the transition of something to something else, i.e. its other, logically speaking something remains the same. Although we move from one to the other, this other is logically the same, because it again is a something. We did not change the something so that it becomes something else, in a way we changed the something else, the other, to become something. So what happened? We had something from which we distinguished something else, and then this something else, the other, became something. The otherness of this other therefore was negated in by these negation of the negation the positive meaning of something was reestablished. This is what Hegel called the true infinity, the transition from one to the other, implies the negation of its own otherness, which is called being for it.
The False Dualism of Finite and Infinite
As such these remarks about finitude and infinity belong to the first cycle of the logic of being which deals with the categories of quality, that is to say the categories that tried to express reality as a positive immediate like being, or something, or becoming. In the comments to paragraph 95 Hegel points to a way of thinking in which the opposition between the finite and infinite is taken to be something absolute. The finite and infinite limit each other and therefore the infinite is in its self finite. The result is that the finite as the same kind of existence and independence as the infinite, and the infinite as the same kind of determination and limitation as the finite. It is obvious that in such a dualism between the finite and the infinite the meaning of both has been changed completely.
The Infinite as Spirit and Idea
In a positive sense Hegel identifies the spirit with the Infinite, which is expressing itself according to paragraph 95 in the shape of the dialectic process, with the Absolute Spirit operating through the dialectic process in the annihilation of all finite determinations. It is the nature of the finite to be only in transition, as a continuous transcending of itself, in other words the finite is not, i.e. it is not the True. The spirit however is the eternal infinite in itself, as the negation of the finite from within. (Compare paragraph 386 of the encyclopedia.)
Infinity of the Spirit
The infinite therefore according to Hegel must ultimately be conceived as subjectivity, as idea or spirit. It is identical with itself. But this identity is not abstract or witout movement. It has to have an identity that goes through its other and returns to itself. That other must be identical however. In some way this ‘other’ must be itself. How can we express that? We can say that the spirit in order to be identical to itself, has to oppose itself to itself, and by transcending that very opposition become identical to itself. In as much as it opposes itself to itself, it also determines and negates itself as the finite, that can now be understood as a moment within the movement of the absolute as Spirit. The absolute in other words alienates itself from itself, and posits itself externally as nature. By understanding the nature that is its other, it returns to itself as Spirit.
Hegel’s Critique of Traditional Theology
It is on this basis that Hegel holds that traditional theology is fundamentally mistaken. By claiming that the infinite God and finite creation must be absolutely distinct, theology actually cancels God's infinity. It is therefore necessary to argue that God contains the world as a moment of his own being. Any other way of looking at it must imply that infinity is limited by the finite, and therefore becomes finite itself.
To be continued...
Should we think of the infinite or absolute as containing the finite?
Philosophy and religion can agree that there is something that exists without any condition, that is purely necessary and is the full foundation and explanation of itself. This is what we commonly call the absolute. It has to be without cause, because any kind of causation implies a condition. The absolute must be independent in the full sense of the word. It cannot be a determination of something else and it must be the sufficient reason of its own being. It follows necessarily that this absolute does not have any real connection to something other than itself through necessity. It is a characteristic of the finite real that it is necessarily connected to something else. In this concept of the absolute, although I have expressed it here in the language of metaphysics and not in the language of Hegel, philosophy and religion would agree.
When we come to discuss the relation between this absolute or infinite and the finite and limited beings, the differences between a strictly Hegelian approach and what I would call “religious metaphysics” will appear.
If we define the absolute as that what is without any inner or external limitation, we may be tempted to identify it with the whole of all real and possible finite beings, which we call the world. This is basically the solution of Spinoza. The infinite would then be the one singular and independent being. The finite beings therefore are not independent, but dependent particular determinations that flow forth from the infinite through something that can be called emanation or immanent causality. The infinite now becomes the one “thing” that contains all the finite beings, because the infinite is the whole. What seems to be other than the infinite, only looks like it because it is a limiting modification of this one independent being or substance. According to Spinoza human beings therefore are not truly independent but the expressions of the one substance.
The problem is , that if we agree that the modes of being follow necessarily from the being of the one substance, the question can be raised whether this one independent substance does rely on these modes of being. Does the infinite substance require the finite modes of being in order to be realized? If we accept a certain distinction between the independent substance and its modes of being and if we accept that the realization of these modes of being is part of the essence of the infinite substance, shall we not conclude that the infinite as such is not completely itself? It needs to realize the many modes of being in order to realize itself. Without these modes of being that flow from it with necessity, it cannot be truly itself. If there were no modes of being, we would deny a necessary characteristic of the one substance. We must therefore conclude that the infinite conceived as the one independent and absolute substance of Spinoza, can only truly be on condition that it realizes separate and finite modes of being. The absolute in Spinoza therefore is not fully unconditional and independent.
In Hegel's dialectic idealism this problem is addressed by conceiving of the infinite not as a substance, but ultimately as subjectivity, as spirit or idea. The whole project of the Phenomenology of Spirit actually is a demonstration that and how substance must be expressed as subject as well. Subjectivity however must be expressed logically as an identity of identity and non-identity. The basic structure of the absolute therefore conforms to something we know about the finite human spirit. Just as a human self-consciousness is a return to itself from its otherness, so also the absolute is a process of returning to its own identity through its own other. The immediate identity of itself is posited as its other, and through this other it returns to itself. In other words, finite Spirit and the infinite spirit are one and the same as dialectical process.
The other element of the problem that Hegel had to resolve is the Kantian insistence on the finite nature of the human spirit. Notwithstanding the fact that the object is completely determined by the subject, we must be aware that this object is appearance, and not the thing in itself. Human knowledge according to this transcendental philosophy, is ultimately restricted to a world of appearances, that cannot be transcended to reach the being in itself of absolute reality. In all 20th-century forms of philosophy, this finite nature of human subjectivity is presupposed. In empiricism and positivism just as well as in the absolute finitude of the human understanding of being in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.
The project of a Hegelian dialectic tries to overcome the opposition between the infinite objectivity of Spinoza's substance, and the finite nature of human subjectivity in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The limitation of thought should be transcended by understanding substance as infinite Spirit, that is as creative and productive infinite knowledge. The finite human spirit then becomes merely the place of the self-consciousness of this infinite Spirit. Because the infinite spirit now contains the finite spirit, the distinction between the thing itself and the appearance has been lifted. And because the finite spirit can understand itself as the self-consciousness of the absolute to which everything other is just a finite moment, all human knowledge becomes an exercise of the infinite and absolute spirit itself, in what is called absolute knowledge. The finite spirit is sublated in the infinite Spirit. Hegel opf course is not denying that “we” are finite Spirits, but our thought in itself is not “finite”.
We must say here that transcendental philosophy was right in emphasizing the finite nature of human knowledge. Nevertheless the limitation of knowledge to experience and appearance falls short of the infinite character of the Spirit.
The point is, that the finite nature of human knowledge, its actual finitude, should be harmonized with the infinite in another way. Not by the Hegelian argument that this actual finitude is the manifestation of the infinite in which it is contained, but rather that the infinite character of the Spirit is virtually present within finite human knowledge. The infinite is not exercised in and as human knowledge, so that finite human self consciousness can be seen as the exercise of the infinite spirit thinking itself. Nevertheless the infinite is an object of human knowledge or rather the necessary horizon in which human subjectivity knows itself and the world.
Whenever human knowledge truly understands the finite as finite, it does not simply overcome its own finite nature to become infinite. But it does find within the finite the trace or reference of the infinite. Thinking the infite is only possible for a finite subject, by thinking the finite as finite. We cannot see the light directly, but by actually seeing whatever is in the light, we are aware of the light that provides the visibility.
Take the example of our understanding of perfections. In any finite object we find a degree of perfection that refers to what is perfect in itself. Every being e.g. has an identity with itself, that is however limited by its necessary connections to other beings on which it is dependent for its own being. That allows us to understand the notion of something that is completely in identity with itself and does not need its other to be what it is. Another example. Human beings show a perfection of freedom, but again mitigated by the context of determining conditions and the necessity of a development in the exercise of this liberty over time. This idea of freedom as a perfection however does refer us to the notion of a fully free subject, that is absolutely sovereign and does not develop its freedom over time.
The necessary finite nature of human knowledge implies a difference between infinite subjectivity and finite subjectivity as such. If the infinite would contain the finite, finite knowledge would be the shape in which the Spirit exercises itself and then the finite nature of human knowledge would be mere appearance.
The basic problem of Spinoza's substance would then return. If the infinite Spirit necessarily expresses itself in the form of human knowledge, then the question arises whether the infinite spirit could be without his expression. If it necessarily expresses itself in human knowledge, in order to be fully itself, then it is dependent on human self-consciousness or knowledge. And if dependent on this selfexpression within the human Spirit, then it is no longer the absolute.
If human self-consciousness does not necessarily flow from the infinite Spirit, but can be conceived as a free expression of the same, then our finite human knowledge no longer necessarily is the exercise of infinite knowledge. Our human knowledge would no longer be qualified as necessary, that is to say as true knowledge.
So we have this paradox: if human self-consciousness flows necessarily from the infinite Spirit, the infinite Spirit is dependent and therefore not absolute. Or, if human self-consciousness does not flow necessarily from the infinite Spirit, our finite understanding of the world is not based on necessity and therefore no longer true.
To be continued…