Oxford Colleges History Aptitude Test: 2004 Paper1 November 2006 Answer ALL parts of BOTH questions. You have TWO HOURS for this test. We recommend that you spend about a third of that time on reading, thinking and planning, and the rest of the time writing. Question one should take about twice as much time as Question Two.If you find the texts difficult and unfamiliar, don’t worry: the exercise is intended to be challenging, but we hope you will also find it thought-provoking. There is no ‘right’ answer to many of the questions: you will be judged on the intelligence of your case, how clearly you make it and how effectively you support it. You should use your own words in answering the questions.Please do not turn over until you are asked to do so. QUESTION ONE(70 marks)This is an extract from a book about Vietnam in 1945. Please read through the extract carefully and think about what it is trying to say. You do not need to know anything about Vietnam or the period to answer the questions below.Nineteen forty-five is the most important year in the modern history of Vietnam. A thousand years of dynastic politics and monarchist ideology came to an end, never to be revived. Eight decades of French colonial rule in Vietnam lay shattered, although its restoration remained an ominous possibility. Five years of Japanese military occupation of Vietnam ceased when Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. During the last two weeks of August, members of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), the Viet Minh[1] and associated groups seized power from what remained of the Japanese-sponsored royal government. On 2 September, Ho Chi Minh[2] proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with himself as president of a provisional government headquartered in Hanoi. Most histories of Vietnam in 1945 stress events in Hanoi, claim a predominant role throughout the country for the ICP, and emphasize revolutionary consciousness over revolutionary spontaneity. This study demonstrates that the reality was much more complicated, and more interesting. The political transformations of 1945 took place in all provincial towns and most rural districts of Vietnam. Particularly in the early stages, from March to June the ICP was only one force among many provoking change. While most of the upheavals in August were sparked by Viet Minh slogans (created or cleared by experienced ICP members), and while almost everyone came to identify with the Viet Minh flag, soon to become the national standard, many local groups calling themselves Viet Minh had almost no idea of what the organization stood for. The hundreds of “people’s committees” and “revolutionary committees” soon affirmed their loyalty to the provisional government, yet they were far from being mere appendages of the central authority or fronts for the ICP. Many of these committees sought revenge for past injustices or projected radical social revolutionary aspirations, both of which the provisional government tried with only partial success to defer in the interests of mounting an effective defence of national independence. From another angle this study shows how the political symbols of the various groups active in Vietnam interacted and conflicted, often with surprising results. At this moment of profound uncertainty for everyone, flags, anthems, salutes, slogans, street names, statues, postage stamps, even rubber stamps, possessed inordinate significance. Although at one level these symbols simply represented organizations, at another they took on lives of their own, causing people to act in ways that no leader could predict, much less direct.Not enough attention has been paid by historians to the manner in which war and revolution feed upon each other. While it is impossible to argue that World War II intruded upon Vietnamese society to the degree that World War I undermined czarist Russia, for example, or Japanese aggression disrupted China in the late 1930s, its effects were nonetheless substantial. Wartime economic dislocations ruined the colonial import-export system, upset local class relationships, and raised the spectre of famine over half the population. The war was responsible too for the mood of fear, anticipation and excitement that gripped many Vietnamese from early 1945 on. Violence was becoming commonplace. It seemed a time for quick action rather than patient reflection, for youthful militancy instead of elderly caution. Because the ICP had survived fifteen years of French repression partly by means of quasi-military discipline and secrecy, it was better placed than most political groups to take advantage of these shifts in attitude.In both war and revolution, opponents are constantly piecing together scraps of information to form pictures, then testing them against preconceived theories or the demands of a particular strategy. What difference leaders make of the available evidence depends largely on what they want to believe or fear to believe. Nonetheless, the group that prepares for the harder alternative, and is willing to act along those lines before the picture is complete, often has the tactical edge. Deferring a decision can be disastrous in war or revolution. This is unlike “normal” times of peace and social order, when leaders often prefer to delay, to commission another study, in the hope that events will resolve dilemmas for them. The Vietnamese royal government and various non-communist political groups understood none of these strategic dynamics in 1945, while local ICP activists grasped the essentials, at least intuitively. (a) Indicate, in no more than 15 lines, the reasons given in the second paragraph for the author’s view that the revolutionary process in Vietnam was ‘more complicated and more interesting’ than is often assumed. Use your own words. (10 marks)(b) Explain why, in the author’s view, the Communist Party was successful in seizing power in Vietnam. Write an answer of about one side in length.(20 marks)(c) In an essay of two or three sides, discuss how far a process of radical political or religious change with which you are familiar was directed by an individual or organization.(40 marks)QUESTION TWO(30 marks) The extract is adapted from an Icelandic story recounting events in the eleventh century. You are not expected to know anything about Iceland or the period. You must read carefully and critically, and use your skills of historical analysis to interpret the extract. Hoskuld, a chieftain has been murdered. Flosi, another chieftain and a relative of the dead man, visits the widow, Hildigunn, with the men of his household.The tables were brought out and Flosi and his men washed their hands. Flosi then sat down at the table and told his men to eat.Hildigunn entered the room and went before Flosi and wept. ‘What action can I expect from you for the slaying, and what support?’ she asked.Flosi said, ‘I will prosecute the case to the full extent of the law, or else make a settlement that good men see as bringing honour to us in every way.’She spoke: ‘Hoskuld would have exacted blood-vengeance if it were his duty to take action for you.’ Hildigunn then went out and opened up her chest. She took from it the cloak which Flosi had given Hoskuld and in which Hoskuld was slain, and which she had kept there with all its blood. She went back into the main room with the cloak. She walked silently up to Flosi. Flosi had finished eating and the table had been cleared. Hildigunn placed the cloak on Flosi’s shoulders; the dried blood poured down all over him.Then she spoke: ‘This cloak, Flosi, was your gift to Hoskuld, and now I give it back to you. He was slain in it. In the name of God and all good men I charge you, by all the powers of your Christ and by your courage and manliness, to avenge all the wounds which he received in dying – or else be an object of contempt to all men.’Flosi flung off the cloak and threw it into her arms and said, ‘You are the worst monster and want us to take the course which will be worst for us all. Cold are the counsels of women.’What does this extract tell us about society and culture in medieval Iceland? (Write about one to two sides.)